> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.bextree.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.bextree.com/security/security-overview.md).

# Security Overview

Bextree's security model rests on one principle: **minimize what Bextree must be trusted with.**

## The trust surface, honestly stated

| Component            | Who controls it             | What could go wrong       | Mitigation                                                                                 |
| -------------------- | --------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Your wallet & keys   | You, always                 | Phishing, seed compromise | Bextree never asks for keys; one-time-nonce signing only                                   |
| Buyer escrow         | On-chain settlement program | Program bug               | Rules encoded in the program; Bextree cannot arbitrarily move escrowed funds               |
| Vaulted LP positions | On-chain vault program      | Program bug               | Custody taken before auction; released only via settlement or seller withdrawal            |
| Streamflow delivery  | The seller, bonded          | Seller doesn't deliver    | Automatic full refund + bond forfeiture (70/30 platform/buyer)                             |
| Marketplace database | Bextree                     | Data tampering            | Money and assets never live here; settlement is verified against chain state, not DB state |

## What Bextree cannot do

* Move funds sitting in escrow, except along the program's encoded paths (pay the seller on verified settlement, or refund the buyer).
* Transfer your assets without your wallet's signature.
* Log you in as someone else — there are no sessions or passwords to steal; every sensitive action needs a fresh wallet signature.

## What Bextree can do (and how it's constrained)

The backend holds one hot key: the **settlement-create authority**, which creates settlement records on-chain when auctions end. Its blast radius is deliberately limited — it cannot redirect escrowed funds to arbitrary destinations, and the treasury destination is enforced by an owner check compiled into the programs. See [Program Architecture](/security/program-architecture.md).

## Current status

Bextree is in public beta. All three on-chain programs are **live on Solana mainnet**, with upgrade authority held by a Squads multisig vault and [program IDs published](/security/program-ids.md). An internal security review of the programs is complete; an independent third-party audit has not yet been performed — see [Future Audits](/security/future-audits.md).